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The COVID-19 pandemic presented the world with a once-in-acentury public health challenge. At the height of the pandemic,
measures to curb the disease shut down large swaths of the global
economy while worldwide demand for international trade in medical
products to fight the pandemic increased, as did dependence on global
supply chains to source medical products.1 The World Trade
Organization (WTO) has played an important role in ensuring
transparency and market access for trade in medical goods despite the
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law (AUWCL)
and Director of International & Comparative Legal Studies.
** Associate, Picard, Kentz & Rowe LLP; American University Washington
College of Law 2021; teaching assistant for Professor Alai.
Authors’ note: This article is based on a talk given in November 2020 on the Role
of the WTO in Pandemics. Much has transpired from the date of that talk and
subsequent drafting of this article generally on the pandemic, including discussions
on the IP waiver of COVID-19 vaccines. Prior to publication the authors attempted
to update some of this information but the situation continues to be evolving and
fluid.
1. See generally Trade in Medical Goods in the Context of Tackling COVID19: Developments in the First Half of 2020, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/medical_goods_update_e.pdf (last
accessed Apr. 12, 2021) [hereinafter Trade in Medical Goods: Developments]
(providing an overview of the surge in trade of medical goods such as personal
protective equipment).
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political, legal, and logistical difficulties COVID-19 and the rise of
protectionism presented.2 However, the WTO is positioned to do more
by taking a more active role in securing the movement of medicines
and medical supplies in this and future pandemics. The WTO is in
need of a revised, twenty-first century mandate.3 The world has
changed not only since the Bretton Woods framework was set up in
1947,4 but also since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
negotiations that led to the establishment of the WTO on January 1,
1995.5 This public health challenge can help the WTO reassert and
refine its mission at a time when its trade negotiations have been
largely moribund and its dispute settlement mechanism under attack.
It is significant that the WTO’s new Director General, Ngozi OkonjoIweala, was previously the Chair of the Global Alliance for Vaccines
and Immunizations (GAVI) and has made vaccine production and
distribution a priority for the WTO.6 On June 15, 2021, the Directors
General of the WTO, World Health Organization (WHO), and World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) met to agree on further
strengthened cooperation for access to medical technologies to tackle
the COVID-19 pandemic.7 This essay will explain briefly how the
2. See Trade in Medical Goods in the Context of Tackling COVID-19, WORLD
TRADE
ORG.
(Apr.
3,
2020),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/rese_03apr20_e.pdf
[hereinafter
Trade in Medical Goods – COVID-19] (listing WTO contributions to liberalizing
the trade in medical goods).
3. See generally James McBride et al., What’s Next for the WTO? COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN
REL.
(last
updated
Feb.
16,
2021),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/whats-next-wto (last accessed Apr. 12, 2021)
(summarizing recent challenges the WTO has faced including the COVID-19
pandemic and pressure from the United States).
4. See The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last accessed
Apr. 10, 2021) (explaining the process of establishing the GATT as the third Bretton
Woods institution in 1947).
5. Id.
6. See Emma Farge, WTO Boss Seeks Boost for COVID-19 Vaccine
Production,
Gets
Backing,
REUTERS
(Mar.
19,
2021),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-wto-vaccines/wto-boss-seeks-boost-forcovid-19-vaccine-production-gets-backing-idUSKBN2B12LO (last accessed Apr.
10, 2021) (detailing Okonjo-Iwela pushing WTO members to implement measures
facilitating COVID-19 vaccine production and distribution).
7. See WHO, WTO, WIPO, Joint Release - Directors General of WHO, WIPO
and the WTO agree on intensified cooperation in support of access to medical
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WTO, as a member-driven institution, has evolved and the challenges
it faces that predate the COVID-19 pandemic. It then looks at some of
the WTO mechanisms and actions that have already played a role
during the COVID-19 pandemic and finally will discuss the potential
future role for WTO in cases of future pandemics.

I. FROM THE GATT TO THE WTO: AN
INSTITUTION AT THE CROSSROADS.
The Bretton Woods Institutions were created in the aftermath of
World War II in order to secure peace for future generations. 8 It was
the belief of those who gathered at Bretton Woods, specifically John
Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, that protectionism and
“beggar thy neighbor” policies contained in the Treaty of Versailles
had ultimately led to the rise of fascism and the Great Depression.9
“Never Again” was the mantra.10 The Bretton Institutions originally
envisioned included: the International Monetary Fund (the IMF), the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World
Bank) and the International Trade Organization (ITO).11 The IMF and
World Bank came into existence shortly thereafter, but the ITO did

technologies worldwide to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, WHO (Jun. 24, 2021),
https://www.who.int/news/item/24-06-2021-directors-general-of-who-wipo-andthe-wto-agree-on-intensified-cooperation-in-support-of-access-to-medicaltechnologies-worldwide-to-tackle-the-covid-19-pandemic (detailing the meeting
and messages from the Directors General of the WTO, WHO, and WIPO).
8. See generally What are the Bretton Woods Institutions? BRETTON WOODS
PROJECT (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/01/art320747/#:~:text=The%20Bretton%20Woods%20
Institutions%20are,to%20promote%20international%20economic%20cooperation
(last accessed Apr. 10, 2021) (describing the purpose of the Bretton Woods
Institutions).
9. See generally JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
THE PEACE (1919) (providing a detailed overview of the negotiation of the peace
treaty with Germany and the subsequent economic impacts on Germany); see also
John Maynard Keynes, National Self-Sufficiency, 22 STUD. IRISH Q. REV. 177, 188–
89 (1933) (referencing the contemporary political landscape and increasing efforts
in European states to become nationally self-sufficient).
10. Martin Wolf, Opinion, Why Agreeing a New Bretton Woods is Vital, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/7cc47dfe-aa95-11dd-897c000077b07658 (last accessed Apr. 10, 2021).
11. BRETTON WOODS PROJECT, supra note 8.
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not.12 The ITO was opposed by the United States Congress, largely
due to concerns of potential ITO involvement in domestic U.S.
economic issues.13 Instead, the General Agreements of Tariff and
Trade (GATT) 1947 was entered into by 23 countries as a provisional
contractual arrangement so that barriers to trade, specifically tariffs,
could be reduced until such time when the ITO can come into
existence.14 From 1948–1994 the GATT functioned under a
provisional constitution and succeeded in reducing tariffs and, to some
extent, other non-tariff barriers under successive rounds of trade
negotiations.15 Finally, under the Uruguay Round of negotiations
(1986-1994) the ITO, now called WTO, was established and the test
of GATT 1947 was incorporated with the WTO Agreements with
additional 21 understandings and modifications.16 By 1995, the world
had changed significantly with the rise of the regulatory and
administrative state in Europe and the United States.
Tariffs were no longer a serious impediment to trade among major
12. See id. (explaining how plans for the ITO were not realized until the
establishment of the WTO in the 1990s).
13. Bretton Woods-GATT, 1941–1947, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/bretton-woods (last accessed Apr.
14, 2021); see also Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs (O’Gara) to the Director of the Executive Secretariat of the
Department of State (McWilliams) (Oct. 12, 1950) (on file with the Office of the
Historian
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d286)
(documenting skepticism on part of U.S. officials during negotiations).
14. See generally Bruce Wilkinson, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),
THE
CANADIAN
ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Feb.
7,
2006)
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/general-agreement-on-tariffsand-trade (last updated Jan. 7, 2021) (providing an overview of the GATT’s purpose
and the process of the WTO superseding the GATT).
15. See Roy Santana, GATT 1947: How Stalin and the Marshall Plan Helped to
Conclude
the
Negotiations,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gatt_e/stalin_marshall_conclude_negotiation
s_e.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2021) (detailing how the GATT’s facilitation of
international co-operation increased security and thereby predictability for those
engaged in international trade); see also The GATT Years: From Havana to
Marrakesh, supra note 4) (describing the series of trade negotiations and GATT
efforts focused on reducing tariffs).
16. See generally The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last accessed
Apr. 10, 2021) (providing an overview of the purpose, timeline, and aftermath of the
Uruguay Round negotiations).

2021]

THE WTO AND PANDEMICS

1039

trading nations.17 Tariffs had been supplanted by multitudes of
regulations and regulatory bodies both at the border and within
states.18 The movement of goods across borders was increasingly
impacted by diverse and complex domestic rules and regulations that
functioned as non-tariff barriers.19 Trade in services, such as financial
services and telecommunications, were subject to regulatory agency
authority.20 As a result, domestic regulatory agencies found their
jurisdictional authority subject to trade negotiations and increasingly
impacted by trade rules within some WTO member states.21 In turn,
tensions arose between trade negotiating authorities and other
domestic regulatory agencies.
By the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the
scope of the WTO’s mandate was far greater than the GATT. In
addition to trade in goods, the WTO Agreements began to address
trade in services, as well as trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights.22 Other areas of domestic and regulatory governance
such as food and product safety and technical standards were added to
the WTO mandate, in addition to the traditional areas of customs
valuation, import and export licensing and unfair trade remedies.23
Linkages of trade to areas such as environment, development and
labor were reflected in the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement
17. See The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, s note 4 (highlighting the
GATT’s successes in tariff reduction and corresponding world trade growth).
18. See id. (explaining how GATT’s success in tariff reduction in part
contributed to governments subsequently pursuing protective measures).
19. See id. (highlighting the complexity of trade in an increasingly globalized
economy and the challenges to liberalizing areas of trade such as agriculture).
20. See The Uruguay Round, supra note 16 (citing both telecommunications and
financial services as new areas of trade negotiated in the Uruguay Round and postUruguay Round agenda).
21. See Anne Kirchner & Joseph Rieras, Why the United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement is Important to FDA, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/fda-voices/why-united-states-mexico-canada-agreement-important-fda (last
accessed Apr. 13, 2021) (explaining the effect of WTO non-tariff agreements on
FDA regulatory authority).
22. See The Uruguay Round, supra note 16 (listing services and intellectual
property among the Uruguay Round agenda items designated for future work).
23. See generally Implementation and Monitoring, WORLD TRADE ORG.
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/monitor_e/monitor_e.htm (last accessed Apr.
12, 2021) (listing the various WTO councils and committees focused on areas of
regulatory governance).
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Establishing the WTO.24 The Preamble of the GATT had been
modified to state that WTO trade liberalization goals of market access
and non-discrimination must be consistent with the “goals of
sustainable development seeking both to preserve and protect the
environment.”25 The WTO preamble also recognized the “need for
positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and
especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the
growth in international trade.”26 It is unclear what this new language
means for the mandate of the WTO. There have been serious
disagreements among WTO members about the inclusion of
environmental and labor standards within the mandate of the WTO.27
The WTO Appellate Body stated that the language of the preamble
under the Vienna Convention on Interpretation of the Law of Treaties
affects the interpretation of other provisions of the WTO
Agreements.28
At the 2001 Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, the WTO
launched a Development Round.29 The Doha Round was never
concluded due to a lack of consensus among members.30 The accession
of China into the WTO that same year and the inability of the WTO to
24. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pmbl.,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; see also Appellate
Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶¶ 141, 142, 153, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998)
[hereinafter United States – Shrimp] (finding the section at issue as “relating to” the
conservation of natural resources under Article XX(g) annexed to the WTO
Agreement).
25. WTO Agreement, supra note 24, pmbl.
26. Id.
27. See generally United States – Shrimp, supra note 24 ¶¶ 127–30 (detailing
the disputes regarding terminology incorporated in the WTO Agreement provisions
concerning environmental protections).
28. See id. ¶¶ 142, 153 (emphasizing that Article XX(g) should be read in
context of the WTO Agreement preamble); see also Appellate Body Report, United
States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 16–18, WTO Doc.
WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted Apr. 29, 1996) (applying principles of treaty interpretation
to Article XX(g)).
29. The
Doha
Round,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm (last accessed Apr. 12,
2021).
30. See McBride et al., supra note 3 (explaining the shifting political landscape
and disagreements regarding subsidies that contributed to the end of the Doha talks).
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restrain the Chinese economic model of state-run capitalism has
undermined the utility of the WTO in the eyes of the United States and
others.31 We must, therefore, assess the role of the WTO against this
backdrop. Is it possible for the WTO to use the COVID-19 pandemic
to demonstrate its relevance and importance to the global community?
The WTO is a member-driven institution. A lot will therefore depend
on the vision and support of the membership and the leadership of the
United States.

II. IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON
TRADE AND THE ROLE OF THE WTO
The outbreak of the COVID-19 virus in 2019 has caused more than
3.95 million deaths globally32 and has imposed physical and societal
restrictions, with the global economy experiencing 4.3% contraction
of global gross domestic product in 2020.33 These restrictions and
impacts on society transferred to trade in goods and services.
The 2020 WTO World Trade Statistical Review showed that the
global Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) for new export orders of
manufactured goods have dropped to 27.1 in April 2020 compared to
the baseline of 50.34 Specific industries, such as the clothing industry,
experienced global demand decreasing by 37% in April 2020, in year31. See generally id. (referring to China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 and
describing the numerous criticisms of the WTO the Trump Administration voiced
regarding its response to China).
32. See WHO, WHO Coronavirus Dashboard, https://covid19.who.int/
(accessed Jul. 02. 2021) (showing that as of 12:21pm CEST, 2 July 2021, there have
been 3,954,324 deaths)
33. See Impact of the COVID 19 Pandemic on Trade and Development:
Transitioning to a New Normal, UNITED NATIONS (2020), 8
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/osg2020d1_en.pdf
(estimating
global contraction at 4.3% in 2020 and acknowledging the widespread
socioeconomic pandemic impacts); see generally Global Economic Prospects,
WORLD BANK GRP. (Jan. 2021), https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/globaleconomic-prospects (providing an overview of COVID-19’s global economic
impact).
34. World Trade Statistical Review 2020, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2020), 26
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2020_e/wts2020_e.pdf; see also
How the World’s Purchasing Managers See Current Business Conditions,
BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/global-pmitracker/?srnd=economics-vp (last accessed Apr. 12, 2021) (demonstrating that all
listed countries had deteriorating PMIs in the period of “April 2020”).
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on-year terms.35 In nations such as Bangladesh, where exports of
clothing account for 33% of its total exports, cancellations of export
orders amounted to US $3.18 billion in April 2020, with exports 81%
lower than in April 2019.36 At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic
wave in the first half of 2020, the volume of global merchandise trade
shrank by 3% year-on-year in the first quarter and experienced an
18.5% year-on-year drop.37
Trade in services also faced stagnation due to the restrictions and
encumbrances imposed by the pandemic.38 International travel, air
transport, cultural events, sporting events, recreational activities, and
hospitality services account for more than 40% of world services
exports.39 According to the WTO Statistical Report, economies that
accounted for more than half of global services exports in 2019 had
experienced a 15% average decrease in services exports by March
2020.40 Some members, such as Italy, experienced up to a 40%
decrease in services exports.41 Global commercial flights dropped
from nearly 120,000 per day in January 2020 to approximately 20,000
in April 2020.42
With the COVID-19 spread around the globe, there was also a
severe shortage of medical personal protective equipment (PPE).43
With the sudden increase in demand, coupled with the disruption of
global supply chains for medical supplies and devices, facilitating the
trade of COVID-19 -related products was critical.44 While total global
35. World Trade Statistical Review 2020, supra note 34, at 52.
36. Id.
37. Press Release, Trade Falls Steeply in First Half of 2020, World Trade
Organization
(June
22,
2020)
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr858_e.htm [hereinafter Trade
Falls Steeply].
38. World Trade Statistical Review 2020, supra note 34, at 31.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Trade Falls Steeply, supra note 37 (charting the daily number of
commercial flights from January 2020 to June 2020).
43. See Trade in Medical Goods: Developments, supra note 1, at 1, 8 (citing the
shortages in medical equipment and coinciding high demand and high tariff rates for
personal protective equipment).
44. See generally id. (highlighting the increased trade in medical goods amid the
COVID-19 pandemic and pertinent WTO efforts to facilitate this trade).
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trade volume declined by 14% in the first half of 2020, imports and
exports of medical goods increased by 16% and amounted to 1.139
billion US dollars in value.45
The WTO already has several monitoring and notification systems
for trade-related measures under various covered agreements such as
the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), The Agreement
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Trade Facilitation Agreement
(TFA), Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), and Agreement
on Agriculture(AA).46 47 The notification requirements contained in
WTO Agreements are imperative in maintaining transparency in the
pandemic. The record-keeping nature of the notification and
monitoring systems provides WTO members with a repository of
information to reference during crucial decision-making.48 Thus, these
transparency obligations under the WTO agreements enable the WTO
to gather information about trade measures related to COVID-19.49
From mid-October 2019 to mid-May 2020, 363 new trade and
trade-related measures were notified, with 198 of them tradefacilitating and 165 trade-restrictive.50 Two hundred and fifty-six of
these measures were COVID-19-related measures.51 In May 2020, at
the General Council meeting of the WTO, the WTO urged the
members to exercise “maximal restraint in the use of export
45. Trade in Medical Goods: Developments, supra note 1, at 1.
46. While the differences and details of these agreements are significant, for the
purpose of this article, the author will not explain the differences between these
agreements.
47. See Implementation and Monitoring, supra note 23 (listing WTO councils
and committees tasked with monitoring trade agreements).
48. See id (explaining how the notification and monitoring system works at the
WTO).
49. See id (discussing the importance of the transparency obligation and the
“regular global trade monitoring reports” on trade practices implemented in response
to global events impacting the economy).
50. See Trade Policy Review Body, Report to the TPRB from the DirectorGeneral on Trade-Related Developments, WT/TPR/OV/W/14, at 2–7 (July 10,
2010),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/TPR/OVW1
4.pdf&Open=True (detailing the key findings of the new trade measures).
51. See id at 7–9, 31–36, 176–228 (detailing the large volume of COVID-19related measures and their necessity for protecting global trade of goods and
services).
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restrictions and other measures that could disrupt supply chains” and
called on members to improve transparency on new COVID-19caused trade-related measures.52 At the meeting, sixty-five WTO
members dedicated themselves exclusively to information and view
sharing on COVID-19 trade-related measures.53 By October 2020,
WTO members repealed 39% of restrictive measures on trade in goods
adopted immediately after the start of the pandemic, while most of the
remaining 124 COVID-19-related measures in the heavily impacted
services sector continue to facilitate trade.54
This constant monitoring, notification, and collection of regulatory
information by the WTO led to the establishment of the COVID-19
Trade Facilitation Repository – a joint platform created by the
partnership of the WTO, WHO, United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), the Commonwealth, the International
Trade Centre (ITC), World Customs Organization (WCO), and the
Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation.55 The Repository consolidates
information on trade-facilitation measures adopted by key
stakeholders and provides access to this information by making it userfriendly and searchable within a single database.56 The Repository
contains a useful listing of all initiatives by organization, type of
measure, and subject matter.57
Countries such as Chile took steps, as early as March, 2020, to
52. World Trade Organization, Export Prohibitions and Restrictions:
Information
Note,
2
(Apr.
23,
2020),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/export_prohibitions_report_e.pdf.
53. See id (describing the increased necessity during the COVID-19 pandemic
of transparency between WTO members).
54. Trade Policy Review Body, Overview of Developments in the International
Trading Environment: Annual Report by the Director-General, 4, WTO Doc.
WT/TPR/OV/23 (Nov. 30, 2020).
55. See Press Release, World Customs Org., WCO partners with stakeholders to
launch a COVID-19 Trade Facilitation Repository (May 19, 2020),
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2020/may/wco-partners-withstakeholders-to-launch-a-covid-19-trade-facilitation-repository.aspx (describing the
collaboration between the organizations and the overall goal of the repository).
56. See id (explaining the goal of the repository).
57. See generally COVID-19 Trade Facilitation Toolkit, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.tfafacility.org/covid19-trade-facilitation (providing measures ranging
from zero tariffs on pandemic related goods, PPEs, and international air transport
association measures; also showing lack of notification from certain countries to the
agreement).
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permit compulsory licensing for COVID-19 vaccines and medicines
utilizing the WTO system.58 While compulsory licensing is often
described as ‘heavy-handed’ due to concerns of the intellectual
property interests of patent holders even within TRIPS and the WTO
regime,59 Article 31 of the TRIPS does allow Members to enact
measures that allow for compulsory licensing on a case-by-case basis
if they satisfy (1) making an effort to obtain authorization for use from
the patent holder on ‘reasonable commercial terms’ before opting for
a compulsory licensing measure,60 except in cases of “NATIONAL
EMERGENCY or OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES OF EXTREME
URGENCY”; (2) ensuring the measure is time-limited; and (3) paying
the patent holder “adequate remuneration.”61 While compulsory
licensing is generally implemented to address the needs of a WTO
member’s domestic market, it may also be used to export the relevant
product to developing countries or least developed countries (LDCs)
that lack the capacity to produce the product.62 This provision of
TRIPS shows that the drafters were concerned with the public health
interests of all WTO members. Most notably, WTO members have
qualified “a national emergency or circumstances of extreme urgency”
as “public health crises including those related to HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria, and OTHER EPIDEMICS.”63 By the end of July
58. See Luis Gil Abinader, Chilean Chamber of Deputies approves resolution
for compulsory licenses for patents relating to the coronavirus, KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT’L, (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.keionline.org/32385 (discussing the
measures implemented by Chile, in particular, in response to the pandemic’s impact
on trade).
59. See e.g., NINA M. HART, CONG. RES. SERV., LSB10436, COVID-19:
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 2 (2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10436
(noting
the
pervasiveness of the “heavy-handed” critique of compulsory licensing regimes).
60. See id. (“except in cases of ‘national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency’”).
61. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
62. See HART, supra note 59 (discussing the ways in which compulsory licensing
can be used by WTO members to aid developing countries with product production).
63. World Trade organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WTO
Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1,
41
ILM
746
(2002),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm
[herinafter Doha Declaration].
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2020, WTO trade monitoring activities recorded forty-seven COVID19-related measures regarding trade-related IP rights taken by twentyfour members.64 Scholars such as Hilary Wong from the University of
California, Berkeley, have also made a case for compulsory licensing
during COVID-19.65 Now, more members are calling for compulsory
licensing, or an intellectual property waiver of COVID-19 vaccines.66
In sum, the WTO provided systems for its members that facilitated
trade and provided transparency in the chaos that the pandemic
presented in 2020. However, with reports of the increasing likelihood
of future pandemics,67 the multilateral trading system must expand
beyond the notification system to further secure and strengthen the
global trade flow of essential medical goods, equipment, and supplies.

64. WTO issues report on measures to expedite access to COVID-19 critical
goods,
services,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.
(September
16,
2020),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/serv_16sep20_e.htm.
65. See Hilary Wong, The case for compulsory licensing during COVID-19, J.
OF
GLOBAL
HEALTH
(May
15,
2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7242884/ (proposing that countries
should plan for the possibility that compulsory licensing will be necessary as a public
health tool in the future).
66. See e.g., Nasos Koukakis, Countries worldwide look to acquire the
intellectual property rights of Covid-19 vaccine makers, CNBC (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/22/countries-look-to-acquire-the-ip-of-vaccinemakers-to-fight-pandemic.html; Manvi Rathod, India and South Africa’s COVID
Vaccine Proposal to the WTO: Why Patent Waiver Must Be Considered Over
Compulsory
Licensing,
IPWATCHDOG
(Jan.
2,
2021),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/01/02/india-south-africas-covid-vaccineproposal-wto-patent-waiver-must-considered-compulsory-licensing/id=128652/;
but see David Lawder, World Bank opposes vaccine intellectual property waiver as
WTO
talks
resume,
Reuters
(Jun.
8,
2021),
https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/world-bank-chiefsays-does-not-support-vaccine-intellectual-property-waiver-wto-2021-06-08/
(detailing the World Bank opposition to the IP waiver of COVID-19 vaccines via
TRIPS Agreement).
67. See Meera Senthilingam, Seven reasons we’re at more risk than ever of a
global pandemic, CNN (Apr. 10, 2017) (suggesting that public health experts have
been forecasting a global pandemic since the stemming of the Ebola epidemic in
2014-16).
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III. ENHANCING THE ROLE OF WTO IN
CONTEXT OF CURRENT AND FUTURE
PANDEMICS.
While the WTO’s notification system enabled the facilitation of
trade through the difficulties presented by the pandemic, there is a
clear need for further facilitating trade in medical goods and supplies,
particularly essential goods in the event of pandemics.68 Healthcare
workers need a consistent, uninterrupted stream of medical supplies
so that the impacts of future pandemics are addressed efficiently and
effectively.69 This section explores the efforts that the WTO can make
to meet that need, apart from the notification system and the
contentious issue of intellectual property waivers.
The 1994 Agreement on Trade in Pharamceutical Products
(Pharmaceutical Agreement) is a pre-existing agreement that can be
expanded to help facilitate the trade of medical supplies. In 1995,
twenty-two members created the WTO Pharmaceutical Agreement
which eliminated tariffs on around 7,000 pharmaceutical products,
their derivatives, and chemical intermediates.70 As of 2016, thirty-four
members control 65% of the global pharmaceutical trade and are
covered under this agreement.71
In April 2020, the Association of German Chambers of Industry and
Commerce (DIHK) published an idea paper on the 1994 Agreement
on Trade in Pharmaceutical Products that extended the scope of the
Agreement to not just pharmaceuticals but also medical supplies,
medical equipment and technology, and personal protective
68. See Report from the office of the Secretary-General of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, COVID-19 and International Trade:
Issues
and
Actions,
at
5
(June
12,
2020),
https://read.oecdilibrary.org/view/?ref=128_128542-3ijg8kfswh&title=COVID-19-andinternational-trade-issues-and-actions (outlining the OECD’s proposals for trade
facilitation in crisis).
69. See id. at 2 (noting the particular impact a less-than-optimal medical supply
stream has on “lower income countries with weaker healthcare systems”).
70. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Trade in Pharmaceutical Products,
Mar. 25, 1994, L/7430, https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/L7599/7430.PDF
[hereinafter WTO Pharma-Agreement].
71. See id. (34 members include: Canada, 27 EU member states, United
Kingdom, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, USA, and Macau [China]).
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equipment.72 The paper also suggests that the Pharmaceutical
Agreement implement transparency obligations for relevant
regulations and increase the number of signatories by providing
additional special support to LDCs to facilitate their participation.73
At the moment, more than half of WTO members levy zero tariffs
on medicine and no member tariff levels exceed 15%.74 Medical
supplies have an average tariff rate of 6.2%.75 Nineteen members apply
zero tariffs on medical equipment while three members levy more than
10%.76 WTO Members have also negotiated the Information
Technology Agreement (ITA) in 1996, which covers eighty percent of
medical equipment traded77; however, essential equipment such as
respirators and ventilators are not covered by the ITA.78 PPEs also vary
widely in terms of tariffs.79 Twenty-nine members apply 5% or less
whereas forty-seven members apply at least 15%.80 Hand soaps
average at 17% with some members going above 50%.81 Face masks
have an average WTO tariff of 9.1%.82 As noted in the idea paper,
“Seventy-five percent of the medical tariffs have been bound through
WTO-agreements. There is a large gap between bound and actually applied
tariffs of WTO-Members: Many countries partially apply lower or no
tariffs but have not bound them in WTO-agreements at this level. At short
notice, these tariffs can thus be increased up to the tariff ceilings bound in
WTO-agreements. 29 WTO-Members have an average bound rate of 50%
or more. Extending the WTO Pharma-Agreement is important for business
72. See Idea Paper Extension WTO Pharmaceutical Agreement, DEUTSCHER
INDUSTRIEUND
HANDELSKAMMERTAG,
1–3
(Apr.
24,
2020),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/dihk_extension_e.pdf (discussing
the scope of the WTO Pharma-Agreement).
73. See id. at 1 (“transparency obligations for relevant regulation as well as best
practice exchanges should be included in the agreement in order to prevent
discriminatory trade barriers”).
74. See id. at 2 (discussing the WTO member levies on medical equipment); see
also Trade in Medical Goods – COVID-19, supra note 2, at 6–8 (noting that over
half of WTO members impose tariffs below 5% on medical products).
75. Trade in Medical Goods – COVID-19, supra note 2, at 7.
76. Id. at 7–8.
77. Id. at 7–9.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 9.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 8.
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to have planning certainty in medical goods trade by reducing global tariff
ceilings.”83

Expanding the Pharmaceutical Agreement to medical supplies and
essential pandemic supplies may provide a solution for WTO
members. The current contentious debate surrounding the intellectual
property waiver of COVID-19 vaccines is largely due to the impact
that such a waiver would have on pharmaceutical companies. The
compulsory taking of intellectual properties run the risk of reducing
the innovation, research, and development in the pharmaceutical
sector. The expansion of the Pharmaceutical Agreement
circumnavigates the intellectual property concern and instead targets
tariff rates, a direct barrier to trade and cause of increased pricing.84
In addition to the expansion of the Pharmaceutical Agreement, the
WTO could further strengthen its cooperation with the WHO
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework for the Sharing of
Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits.85 The
PIP Framework enables the global sharing of benefits and
management of related intellectual property.86 The Framework has the
ability to extend its benefits to intellectual properties of medical
supplies and equipment. The Standard Material Transfer Agreements
(SMTA) under the PIP Framework stipulate that participating
laboratories should not seek to obtain intellectual property rights on
PIP biological materials, but rather enter into benefit-sharing
agreements.87 This allows laboratories from different members to
83. Idea Paper Extension WTO Pharmaceutical Agreement, supra note 72.
84. See Trade in Medical Goods – COVID-19, supra note 2 at 7 (noting the
proposal for a “zero-for-zero plurilateral sectoral initiative on pharmaceutical
products” that dates back to the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994).
85. See generally Report by the Director-General, Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness Framework for the sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines
and
other
benefits,
World
Health
Organization
(2020),
https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/pip-framework/governance/wha7212-op1a-report-edited_en1a2d0386-152a-4bbd-b8019ec5d71e8930.pdf?sfvrsn=80f75c02_16&download=true (outlining the WHO’s
proposed preparedness framework).
86. See id. at 4 (suggesting as an example of sharing benefits that “viruses with
human pandemic potential . . . should also be shared with WHO Collaborating
Centres” in order to facilitate a watch-dog approach to preventing future outbreaks).
87. See id. at 5 (suggesting that benefit-sharing agreements could help facilitate
research).
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simultaneously develop needed supplies.88 For example, members
could streamline copper-lined mask development with specialized
fabrics with antimicrobial characteristics.89 An integration of PIP
framework participation in trade agreements or the Pharmaceutical
Agreement would not only increase member participation in the
framework but also foster multinational innovation in medical
supplies and equipment.
The crucial task for the WTO to address is to balance the domestic
needs versus the global needs of members. In times of pandemic,
members need to secure domestic supplies and lower domestic prices
of pharmaceuticals and pandemic-related products and services. This
need can incentivize members to pass domestic measures that
encumber the export of their medical supplies via tariff rates or
absolute prohibition. The increased amount of export prohibitions and
simultaneous lack of multilateral transparency of these measures is
concerning because restrictions initiated by one member-state may
trigger a domino effect and result in lower overall supply and higher
prices for essential goods.90 Members also require predictable access
of pharmaceutical products and pandemic-related products and
services to peoples of all WTO members. Through the expansion of
the Pharmaceutical Agreement and further integration of the WHO
PIP Framework, the WTO can support a predictable and affordable
access of pandemic-related products and services without infringing
on the rights of private companies or the sovereignty of members.

88. See id. (noting that simultaneous supply development could aid in stemming
future outbreaks).
89. See Surjith Kumaran et al., Photopolymerizable, Universal Antimicrobial
Coating to Produce High-Performing, Multifunctional Face Masks, AMERICAN
CHEMICAL
SOCIETY
(Apr.
26,
2021),
https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/acs.nanolett.1c00525 (suggesting a potential
avenue for facemask improvement and research); but see Katherine J. Wu, Copper
Won’t Save You From Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/copper-coronavirus-masks.html (suggesting that
public health experts have found no evidence to support the utility of copper-infused
mask development).
90. See COVID-19: 80 countries prohibit, restrict export – WTO, LAUD BUS.
(Apr. 27, 2020), https://laudbusiness.com/2020/04/27/covid-19-80-countriesprohibit-restrict-export-wto/ (noting the scope of the detrimental effects from a
potential domino cascade in the supply chain for essential goods).
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CONCLUSION

The WTO is under strain and stress.91 The Doha development round
of negotiations is dead because of a lack of trust and cooperation
among its member governments. But the COVID-19 pandemic is a
global pandemic. More than at any other time in recent memory, the
interests of its members are aligned. The challenges posed by the
COVID-19 pandemic provide an opportunity for the WTO, as a
consensus-driven institution, to succeed and demonstrate its
relevance.
In recent months, WTO has moved to collaborate more closely with
WHO and WIPO and with International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank to call for increased access to vaccines building up on the
global vaccine access program. This cooperation should be applauded.
This cooperation of economic international institutions with those
advocating for social rights is an important step and the WTO stands
at the border of economic and social rights and has for the past two
decades attempted to balance those interests through its dispute
settlement mechanism. In addition, WTO has mechanisms in place
already, including but not limited to, the transparency provisions, such
as notification of new restrictions on flow medical supplies and a
pharmaceutical agreement that could be amended. As Director of
WTO IP Division, Antony Taubman recently stated, “right to health is
a fundamental human right and the WTO’s constitution dating back to
GATT days of 1946 recognizes that achievement in health for one
state benefits the whole international community and necessary
prerequisite for the goal of sustainable development”.92

91. See generally Charles Riley, A woman will oversee global trade for the first
time, CNN (Oct. 8, 2020), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/08/business/wtodirector-general-trade/index.html (noting that the new Director-General “has
described the WTO as ‘being at a crossroads’ . . . ‘[t]he global economy is under
tremendous strain.’”).
92. Antony Taubman, Dir., Intell. Prop. Div. WTO, Remarks at Am. U. Wash.
Coll. L. WTO and US Trade Law and Policy Seminar (July 1, 2021).
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